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On the Grouping of Tasks into Firms: 
Make-or-Buy with Interdependent Parts* 
Abstract 
We study the division of labor within a supply chain and look for the 
optimal grouping of tasks into firms. Using a unique dataset on supply chains in 
the global automobile industry, we present robust evidence consistent with the 
view that the firm is a low variable-, but high fixed cost way to govern 
adjustments. The results are strong, suggesting that the theory captures an 
important effect. By taking account of interdependencies between parts, our 
econometric approach generalizes standard make-or-buy analysis and yields 
improvements in predictive accuracy.  
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What determines how the sub-tasks of a production process are grouped 
into firms? This is a slightly novel way of asking a question that is central to our 
understanding of the nature of coordination within and between firms. Many 
classical theories in the field suggest that the inefficiencies of markets increase 
with the number of transactions, while the costs of integration are more or less 
fixed.1 We here examine a similar, but subtly different proposition: that the 
grouping of tasks is influenced by the frequency with which they have to be 
coordinated. Using unique data on eight supply chains in the global automobile 
industry, we test the proposition that the firm is a low variable-, but high fixed 
cost way to govern adjustments. 
Because our hypothesis involves the entire supply chain, the empirical 
specification relaxes an independence assumption implicitly made in most studies 
of make-or-buy decisions.2 From the perspective of our model, a make-or-buy 
study starts with a focal task and works off the  relationship between that and each 
of the other tasks, while ignoring relationships between pairs of non-focal tasks. 
For example, suppose that tasks 1 and 2 should be together and that tasks 2 and 3 
should be together as well. In this case tasks 1 and 3 will be together 
independently of their direct relationship, and it is meaningless to perform a 
make-or-buy analysis of the question. 
                                                 
1 In particular, Coase (1937) emphasized the need to avoid the haggling costs associated with 
market transactions, Simon (1951) used implicit super game arguments to suggest that more 
frequent trades should be internalized, and Williamson (1979) similarly argued that higher 
frequency of trade, combined with asset specificity, favors integration. 
2For example,  Monteverde and Teece (1982), Novak and Eppinger (2001), Simester and Knez 
(2002), and Nagaoka, Takeishi, and Noro (2008). Lafontaine and Slade (2007) present a quite 
complete review of this very large literature. 
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In a model that takes all pair-wise relationships are taken into account 
simultaneously, we show: (1) that any two tasks are more likely to be performed 
by the same firm if mutual adjustments are needed on a sufficiently frequent 
basis, (2) that a disproportionate share of all adjustments are managed inside 
firms, and (3) that supply chain design can be portrayed as the solution to an 
integer program aimed at minimizing the sum of adjustment-costs within and 
between firms.3 The results are strong and robust, suggesting that the theory 
captures an important effect. To evaluate the practical importance of the above-
mentioned independence assumption, we compare the analysis with a standard 
make-or-buy estimation and find that the predictive accuracy is much improved 
by taking into account the interdependencies between tasks.   
While our test is more powerful, data requirements and computational 
difficulties are obstacles to its use. For each pair of parts, we need data on the 
frequency with which mutual adjustments are needed; and for each part, we need 
to know its producer. Publicly available sources do not contain this type of 
information, and we had to make an extremely large investment in data collection 
in order to acquire it. The second problem concerns the estimation procedure. 
Even for small sets of parts, there are a very, very large number of possible 
groupings of tasks, each of which needs to be considered as a counterfactual. 
                                                 
3 While few economists have studied supply chains, they have received a lot of attention in 
operations management, primarily in the context of the “Design Structure Matrix” (Steward, 1981; 
Eppinger, 1991; and Baldwin and Clark, 2000). This matrix summarizes the direction and 
importance of information flows between pairs of tasks, and is a tool for managing new product 
development processes. It contains more and different information than that used here and the 
question of firm boundaries is of little interest to this literature. However, it is interesting to note 
that Baldwin and Clark (2000, p. 368ff.) adopt arguments similar to those tested here and suggest 
that firm coordination carries low variable costs compared to market coordination.  
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Since the dependencies cause extreme non-linearities, we use simulated GMM to 
estimate the model. A very large integer programming problem has to be solved 
in each simulation, and we believe that our 36 parts are close to the limit of what 
is currently practical. On the other hand, the efforts at data collection and 
computation have given us a very well-fitting structural model. 
After a brief review of the theory, we derive the hypotheses in Section II. 
The data are described in Section II, and estimation techniques and results are 
presented in Section III. In Section IV, we briefly compare our estimates with 
those from a traditional make-or-buy model, and the paper concludes with a 
discussion in Section V. 
I. Theory and Hypotheses 
In spite of its central importance to the field, economists have not yet 
agreed on a theory of the firm. The several competing theories include, but are not 
limited to, those of Coase (1937), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore 
(2008), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), Simon (1951), and Williamson (1979). 
A significant amount of empirical work has failed to settle the issue, possibly 
because many of the theories are difficult to conclusively falsify with the datasets 
used.  
In the present paper, we are able to perform a direct test of the adjustment-
cost theory of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1997). There are two reasons for this. First, 
our data map precisely to the central prediction of the theory - that tasks in need 
of more frequent mutual adjustments are grouped together. Secondly, the 
prediction is robust across a variety of extensive forms. 
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Given this, we now summarize the underlying argument. Consistent with 
Hart’s (2008) call for theories relying on non-Coasian bargaining, the adjustment-
cost theory of the firm compares alternative game forms in light of the costs of 
change (adjustment). In its simplest form, it looks at a trading relationship 
between two players in which maximization of joint payoffs occasionally requires 
that the actions of one or both players change. The theory looks for the most 
efficient game form with which the players can agree on the adjustments and 
associated changes in payments. There are a sea of possibilities, but for the 
present purposes we will compare two alternatives: “Negotiation-as-needed” in 
which the players have a bilateral discussion about each adjustment and 
associated changes, and an “Employment Relationship” in which one player ex 
ante agrees to let the other dictate what happens in case of adjustment, while both 
retain the right to terminate the relationship.4 Purchases governed through these 
two game forms could be a house renovation and secretarial services. The theory 
is controversial because the adjustment-costs, through which it compares the 
game forms, essentially are bargaining costs.5  
Costs of bargaining may be incurred before, during, or after the process. 6 
The most obvious source is the time consumed during bargaining. Any explicit 
model of alternating offer bargaining must posit some costs of refusing an offer 
                                                 
4 Since players can save pricing costs in a wide set of circumstances, it is not uncommon to see 
hybrid game forms with employment-like elements in other game forms. For example, a haircut 
can typically be “as you like it”. However, consistent with everyday language, the term 
“employment relationship” is reserved for the extreme case in which one player’s discretionary 
power includes at least some adjustments to the work methods used by the other. (You could not 
ask the beautician to cut with the other hand.) 
5 In the simplest versions, we assume that all efficient adjustments are implemented, such that 
gains from trade have no impact on the comparisons. 
             6 The exact nature of the bargaining costs is not essential to the argument. 
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and making a counter, since the process otherwise would go on ad infinitum. 
Delays are strictly out-of-equilibrium outcomes in the most simple models 
(Rubinstein, 1982), but not in richer settings (Watson, 1998). Consistent with this, 
a survey by Purchasing Magazine suggests that US purchasing managers spend 
15% of their time on price negotiations. Costs incurred prior to bargaining may be 
an even more important source. It is well-documented that better-informed 
bargainers get better results (Busse, Silva-Risso, and Zettelmeyer, 2006), and 
while this result does not figure prominently in the theoretical literature, it is easy 
to understand. The idea is that players, prior to bargaining, can invest to get 
information that will improve their shares, but not the overall gains from trade. 
Consistent with the importance of anticipatory bargaining costs, the above-
mentioned survey of purchasing managers found that they spent about 25% of 
their time “Preparing Bids” and “Researching Prices”. Finally, Hart and Moore 
(2008) have recently argued that any not-ex-ante-agreed-upon outcome produces 
post bargaining aggrievement towards the trading partner and a reduction in gains 
from trade.  
Given the existence of bargaining costs, the argument is simple. Since the 
employment relationship involves less negotiation per adjustment, it has lower 
variable costs. On the other hand, employment entails some fixed costs ex ante 
because the parties have to reach agreement on the arrangement. There are no 
such fixed costs with negotiation-as-needed because no ex ante agreement is 
needed to open negotiation ex post. So among these two game forms, 
“Negotiation-as-needed” is most efficient when adjustments are rare and the 
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“Employment Relationship” is the lowest cost solution when adjustments are both 
frequent. Different implications of the theory have been tested before, for 
example by Simester and Knez (2002), but the present paper is the most extensive 
test by far.   
The product consists of N parts, and for each of the N(N-1)/2 pairs i and j 
we know the frequency with which there has to be a coordinated adjustment in 
them.7 We denote this variable by aij. Since the parts are complex in themselves, 
there is no automatic transitivity in the need for adjustment. That is, it is possible 
that a12  > 0, a23  > 0, and a13  = 0. The first two sets of adjustments could be 
necessary without the third being so (as if the first is about color and the second is 
about size).   
The set of parts N (│N│=N) can be made by anywhere from one to N 
firms and we define a supply chain design (aka a grouping of tasks) as a partition 
S = {S1, S2,…, Sn} of N into n  ≤  N non-empty, non-overlapping sets (aka firms). 
We take the frequency of needs for adjustments as exogenously given and assume 
that the parties can contract on designs, but not on ex post bargaining behavior.8  
Given this, we make the standard assumption that the players write the most 
efficient contracts and look for the design with the smallest total adjustment-
costs.9  While this is a choice, it is not unreasonable. Several supply chains 
compete in our empirical setting and it is fair to conjecture that the more 
                                                 
7 For the present purposes, we only consider mutual adjustments betweens pairs of parts. We could 
more generally think of all higher orders up to N.  
8 While we thus treat technology, represented by the frequency of needs for mutual adjustments, as 
exogenously given, it is obviously endogenous in the very long run. For example, it takes up to ten 
years to launch a new technological platform in this industry 
9 Many papers on the theory of the firm, including all those cited at the start of this Section, make 
this assumption. 
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efficiently organized chains survive. The assumption is nevertheless strong and it 
would be nice to develop a non-cooperative foundation for it.10 At the same time, 
the extreme complexity of the issues studied means that any justification in terms 
of equilibrium, and even survival, stretch common sense.  
We use i and j as generic parts produced in firms I and J, respectively, 
while b and c are generic firms. The variable adjustment-costs, per adjustment per 
pair, are m in the market and f(Sb) < m in a firm of size Sb≡| Sb|, where the f’s are 
non-decreasing. Total fixed adjustment-costs are w(Sb-1) in a firm of size Sb (and 
0 in the market). To keep things simple, we assume that all adjustments are 
implemented, regardless of the costs thereof. Recalling that I is the set of parts 
made by the same firm as part i, total expected costs are therefore (N-n)w + 
½Σi∈N[f(SI)Σj∈I aij + mΣj∉I aij], and the cost-minimizing grouping solves the 
Partitioning Problem (P): 
MinnMinS (N-n)w + ½Σi∈N[f(SI)Σj∈I aij +mΣj∉I aij], s.t. 
Ubn=1 Sb = N, ∩b,c≠b Sb Sc = Ø, and Sb  ≠ Ø for all b.            (P) 
There are a finite number of possible groupings, so while it is hard to characterize 
solutions, they trivially exist. 
We test the theory from three different angles. We start by checking the 
first-order implication that two parts i and j are more likely to be made by the 
same firm if aij is higher. To account for indirect effects, we then look at the entire 
supply chain and find that a disproportionate number of adjustments are managed 
                                                 
10 The most natural way to do this would be to look at each part as a player. However, since the 
industry originally was more, rather than less, integrated, this might not be the correct 
specification. In any event, the game is sure to be poorly behaved.  
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inside firms. We finally estimate a structural model in which supply chain design 
is found as a solution to a program like P aimed at minimizing total adjustment-
costs.  
II. Data 
  We have data from the late 1980s on eight supply chains pertaining to 
eight different cars in the luxury-performance segment of the automobile market. 
We look at each supply chain as a separate data set and will henceforth use that 
term and label them, or the cars they produce, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H. Since 
there is virtually no overlap between the participants in the eight supply chains, we 
treat them as independent, but identical.11 That is, we assume that the same 
technology and the same set of parts, and therefore the same adjustment 
frequencies, drive the design of all eight supply chains. So we can estimate on a 
per-car basis, or pool the data across all eight.  
A car consists of more than ten thousand parts.12 Since we need 
information on N(N-1)/2 pairs of parts, computational constraints and problems 
associated with administering very long questionnaires force us to divide the set 
of parts into 36 “megaparts”, henceforth “parts”, for the purposes of the study. 
                                                 
11 Across the 36x8 part-car combinations, very few were subject to inter-car linkages: one firm made 
a part for 4 cars, three made a part for 3 cars, and eight made a part for 2 cars. In each of these cases, 
the firm was required to have separate employees and often even separate production facilities to 
serve each customer. 
12 A possible critique of any study of integration, and thus this, is that one could bias the results by 
including “irrelevant” parts. The idea is best brought out by fixing ideas on an example, such as 
office supplies. Suppose that some unknown factor causes office supplies to be outsourced and have 
zero mutual adjustment frequencies with all the other parts. In this case, the estimated relationship 
between in-sourcing and mutual adjustment frequencies would be stronger if office supplies were 
included in the sample. We have four responses to this critique. First, the exact same argument could 
be made about a traditional make-or-buy study testing the importance of specific investments. 
Second, all of our parts are components of the cars in question, and no components have been left 
out. Third, not a single one of our parts are produced in isolation across all eight supply chains. 
Finally, it is not clear what this “unknown factor” could be.  
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This aggregation is not arbitrary, but reflects industry use. More importantly, our 
data are such that all megaparts in all cars are assembled by a single firm. That is, 
there are no instances in which a firm delivers a fraction of one megapart plus 
another megapart. So no inconsistency is introduced by conducting the study at 
the megapart level, although we do lose a significant amount of information. In 
particular, we can not make use of the fact that the sub-components of the parts 
are co-produced, even though our theory speaks directly to it.  
        Since there are 36 “parts”, we have 630 pairs of parts, and we know the 
frequency with which mutual adjustment is needed as well as whether or not they 
are co-produced (made by the same firm)The (mega)parts are listed in Table 1 
below. 
       Table 1 
List of Parts 
Body-in-white Airbag controller Intake manifold Alternator 
Body sheet metal Airbag Crankshaft Speed control 
Headlining Power steering gear Camshaft Automatic transmission 
Bumpers Steering linkage Piston Suspension 
Safety belts Steering column Intake valves Drive shaft 
Lock cylinders Steering wheel Radiator ABS system 
Door handles Power steering pump Starter Spindle assembly 
Windshield washers Cylinder head Distributor Upper and lower arms 
Seat system Engine block Instrument panel AC assembly 
 
  The data on supply chain design (patterns of co-production), as 
well as some of our information about adjustment frequencies, come from 
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interviews conducted by one of the authors. These interviews were very extensive 
and wide-ranging – involving more than 1000 employees of the eight firms. They 
included specific questions identifying the producer of every part as well as the 
need to coordinate between parts. Subjects were not systematically asked about 
adjustment frequencies, but the topic was repeatedly touched upon and the 
interviewer used her notes to construct estimates for all (part, part) pairs. 
Specifically, for each pair of parts, she rated “the frequency with which there 
needs to be a mutual adjustment in this pair" on a seven point scale from 0 - 6.13 
Most of the mutual adjustments between parts occur during the design phase (at 
the time of the interviews all parts were designed by the party producing them.): 
Several parts are strongly interdependent. For example the engine and the body, 
the pistons and the intake valves, the lock cylinders and the door handles, etc. 
Even small changes in one of these are likely to have implications for the other. 
Other pairs are less tightly linked, and most are for all practical purposes 
independent. 14 
A possible problem is that the interviewer rated the adjustment frequencies 
with knowledge of the hypothesis to be tested. As an ex post check, we therefore 
used a questionnaire to collect a second set of adjustment frequencies from an 
industry expert who was unaware of the hypothesis. Our expert is Dan Whitney, 
who for many years has played a major role in MITs International Motor Vehicle 
Program. After getting a table with the 630 (=36 x 35/2) pairs of parts, this expert 
                                                 
13  Virtually all economic research based on questionnaire data use such Likert-type scales and 
proceeds to treat them as continuous in the statistical analysis. We follow this practice but realize 
that one can construct examples in which the ordinal scale corrupts the statistical inferences.  
14 Table A-1 in the Appendix displays the interview data on adjustment frequencies along with the 
co-production data for car A. 
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was asked to think of a typical luxury-performance car in the late 1980s, and 
answer the question: "Please consider a pair of parts and rate, on a scale from 0-6, 
the frequency with which there needs to be a mutual adjustment in this pair." It 
turns out that the questionnaire ratings are extremely similar to the interview 
ratings. The expert could have calibrated the seven point scale differently than the 
interviewer, but at .88 and .87 the means are almost identical, as are the fraction 
of frequencies rated zero (.72 and .74). Most importantly, there is a highly 
significant Spearman rank-order correlation of .915 between the two data sets. To 
keep the argument as clean as possible, all results reported in the body of the 
paper are based on the expert’s questionnaire responses. Analog analyses, based 
on our interviews, are reported in the Appendix. As can be seen there, the results 
are essentially the same for both measures.  
Some descriptive statistics are given in Table 2, in which the second 
column indicates the fraction of each car’s parts that are co-produced, the third 
gives the sizes of all clusters of co-produced parts, and the r’s in the fourth 














adjustment frequency)  
A .29 19, 5, 2, 2, 2 .53  
B .26 16, 9, 4, 2 .51 
C .14 13, 5, 2, 2, 2 .61 
D .18 15, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2 .58 
E .79 32 .51 
F .17 14, 5, 3, 3, 2, 2 .54 
G .12 12, 4, 3, 2, 2, 2 .63 
H .11 11, 4, 3, 3, 2 .64 
                                 1N=630.  
Looking first at the fraction of parts that are co-produced, we notice that 
all the supply chains are designed differently, with E as an extreme outlier.15 This 
heterogeneity ought to make us pessimistic about our tests, since we hypothesize 
that all supply chains are solutions to the same optimization problem, but observe 
apparently very different designs. As a first clue that this pessimism would be 
unfounded, we see in all eight cases a very strong rank-order correlation between 
co-production and adjustment frequency. In spite of the differences, all the 
designs reflect a strong influence of adjustment frequency. 16 
 
 
                                                 
15 E represents a corporate form not used in the U.S., and it is possible to argue that the 32 parts are 
produced by three, rather than one, firm. However, we wanted to be as conservative as possible. It 
should also be noted that three of the other supply chains are anchored in the same country as E. 
16 If all observations were independent, the Spearman correlations in Table 2 would have t-values 
(~25r) above 10. However, as noted earlier, the data exhibits complicated dependencies, because 
“parts 1 and 2 are co-produced” and “parts 2 and 3 are co-produced” imply that “parts 1 and 3 are 
co-produced”. So the correlations in Table 2 do in some sense overstate the degrees of freedom but 
are suggestive.  
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III. Estimation Techniques and Results  
In this Section we present three successively deeper tests of the 
relationship between adjustment frequency and co-production. To assess the 
robustness of the theory, we have done most of these tests on a car-by-car, rather 
than pooled, basis. We start by looking at direct effects only, asking whether two 
parts are more likely to be co-produced if mutual adjustments are needed more 
frequently. This is done for each pair, while incorporating corrections for the 
interdependencies between the pairs. To take account of indirect effects, we then 
go to the supply chain-level and compare the sum of internalized adjustment 
ratings against the distribution of the same measure in random supply chain 
designs. We finally estimate a model in which supply chain design is portrayed as 
the outcome of a maximization problem aimed at internalizing a weighted average 
of adjustments and random noise. This allows us to evaluate the importance of 
adjustment costs relative to other forces in supply chain design. 
III.i. Tests at the pair-by-pair level 
There are many ways to draw statistical inferences about the relationship 
between co-production and adjustment frequency at the pair-by-pair level. We 
have chosen to compare the actual design (the actual pattern of co-production) to 
those in randomly generated allocations of the 36 parts to firms of the same size.17 
To this end we drew 100,000 randomly designed supply chains each having the 
                                                 
17 It may seem more natural to compare against “completely” random designs generated by 
allocating each of the 36 parts to 36 equiprobable firms without the constraint on firm sizes. The 
problem is that all eight supply chains have quite skewed size-distributions, with the owner of the 
brand name being very large. Such large firms, and thus instances of co-production, would be 
relatively rare in a set of completely random designs, implying that our results would be much 
stronger. However, we do not feel comfortable attributing the skewed size-distributions to our 
theory alone (the brand name manufacturers are becoming less and less integrated, but are still 
making a very large share of all parts). 
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same size distribution as the actual. We then compared random and actual designs 
in terms on the probability that pairs of parts with identical adjustment 
frequencies are co-produced. The results are given in Table 3 below. 
Table 3 
Probability of Pairwise Co-production by Adjustment Frequency1 
Car 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
A .232  (.001) .364  (.234) .500  (.089) .517  (.020) .286  (.598) .500  (.012) .867  (.001) 
B .221  (.008) .273  (.474) .250  (.605) .448  (.026) .314  (.272) .406  (.050) .600  (.019) 
C .105  (.002) .242  (.139) .150  (.533) .379  (.004) .257  (.056) .188  (.306) .333  (.095) 
D .141  (.006) .152  (.681) .200  (.491) .345  (.045) .257  (.173) .313  (.057) .733  (.000) 
E .761  (.087) .939  (.113) .800  (.662) .897  (.164) .771  (.683) .844  (.301) .933  (.283) 
F .150  (.047) .121  (.795) .150  (.650) .345  (.029) .229  (.245) .281  (.089) .333  (.140) 
G .090  (.005) .091  (.745) .050  (.887) .241  (.070) .229  (.059) .250  (.038) .667   (.001) 
H .077  (.004) .030  (.963) .200  (.194) .172  (.202) .257  (.007) .125  (.458) .600  (.000) 
1 p-values in parentheses refer to tests relative to 100,000 randomly designed supply chains.  
 
 
Since there is a lot of information in Table 3, we will briefly look at the 
interpretation of a couple of cells. The .232 in the “A, 0” cell means that 23.2% of 
all pairs rated 0 were co-produced in supply chain A. Recalling from Table 2 that 
29% of all pairs are co-produced in this supply chain, a random design would 
have that percentage instead of the 23.2 and the statistical significance (.001) 
refers to a test versus that benchmark. Similarly, the .333 in the “C, 6” cell means 
that 33.3% of all pairs rated 6 were co-produced in supply chain C. Given the 
relatively small cell-size, this is not significantly (p = .095) more than the 14% 
one would expect from a random design. 
The lacking significance for supply chain E is perhaps surprising in light 
of the high Spearman correlation (.51) from Table 2. However, the high level of 
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co-production “eats up degrees of freedom” and causes the performance 
difference between a random and an optimal design to be very small, leaving us 
with less statistical power. We will see this more clearly in the supply chain level 
analysis presented below.  
Looking beyond the individual entries at the overall pattern of results in 
Table 3, we see that most rows show a monotonic increase indicating that pairs 
are more likely to be co-produced if the adjustment frequency is higher. We could 
also perform a statistical test of this relationship, but since a more correct analysis 
takes indirect effects into account, we do not offer any analyses of direct effects 
beyond those reported above. 
In spite of the fact that we used the aforementioned conservative test, 
Table 3 shows support for the hypothesis that a pair of parts is more likely to be 
produced by the same firm if mutual adjustments are needed on a more frequent 
basis. The results are also broadly based in the sense that we see the same general 
pattern across all the industries in spite of their apparent differences. 
III.ii. Tests at the supply chain level 
The analysis in Table 3 is incomplete because it only takes direct effects 
into account. In fact, it is closely related to the one-part-at-a-time studies 
criticized in the Introduction. To capture indirect effects, we need a test that takes 
account of the entire matrix of adjustment frequencies. To this end, we use as our 
measure the sum of importance-weighted internalized adjustments. This can be 
formally expressed as Σijzijaij, where zij is a 0-1 indicator of co-production. (We 
will later see that this is the correct measure of performance if the number of 
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firms is held constant and the variable adjustments-costs are independent of firm 
size.) To test the hypothesis that a disproportionately large number of adjustments 
are internalized, we compare the actual value of this measure against those in 
100,000 random designs.18 Following the arguments made before Table 3, we 
again opt to be conservative and constrain the random designs to have the same 
firm sizes as the actual.  
The use of Σijzijaij assumes that we can treat the aij‘s as cardinal although 
they in fact are ratings on a discrete seven point scale. This is a problem if the 
ratings are non-linear in the true adjustment frequencies. At best, it introduces 
noise and bias against hypotheses, and at worst it might cause the measure to rank 
alternative designs incorrectly. It is hard to assess the seriousness of this problem, 
but it is one the paper shares with most other studies based on questionnaire data.  
The results of the test are presented in Table 4 below. The second column 
give the means of the measures (EΣijzijaij) based on the simulations, the numbers 
in the fourth column (MaxzΣijzijaij) are its theoretical maximum (the best that can 
possibly be done within the constraints of the actual size-distribution) and is 
found by integer programming.19 The third column reports the actual measures of 
internalized adjustments (Σijyijaij), where yij is the value taken by zij in the data (a 
0-1 indicator of actual co-production). 
 
                                                 
18 Another way to approach the problem is to use an entirely different statistical technique. A 
particularly interesting candidate may be cluster analysis, the use of which has some history in 
sociological and ecological studies of network effects (Frank, 1995). 
19 There are many ways to formulate the IP in question, but the essential trick is to define a set of 
0/1 variables for each firm/part pair. That is, if the supply chain has a firm with 6 parts, the 36 
variables in question have to sum to one.  
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Table 4 
Sum of Internalized Adjustments by Supply Chain1 
1 p-values in parentheses refer to tests relative to 100,000 randomly designed supply chains. 
 
Consistent with the results at the pair-by-pair level, we see that the 
measures at the level of supply chains, except for car E, are very significant. In 
fact, four of the supply chains internalize more adjustments than 99,995 randomly 
generated designs, and G beats all 100,000. The result is also robust in the sense 
that all supply chains show similar patterns. So with the exception of supply chain 
E, there is statistical support for the claim that a disproportionate number of 
adjustments are managed inside firms.  
One way to measure the magnitude of the effect is by comparing the 
performance of random designs (EΣijzijaij), actual designs (Σijyijaij), and optimal 
designs (MaxzΣijzijaij). We can interpret (Σijyijaij - EΣijziaij)/(MaxzΣijzijaij - EΣijzijaij) as 
the actual “excess internalization” divided by the highest possible “excess 
internalization” (what would be observed if the theory explained everything and 
our measures were perfect). The average of this ratio is around .33, suggesting 
that one third of the forces captured by our measures are reflected in the actual 
design. However, the sheer size of the optimization problem raises an almost 
Car EΣijzijaij Σijyijaij MaxzΣijzijaij 
A 161 275  (.0001) 395 
B 142 221  (.002) 397 
C 79 143  (.005) 288 
D 100 195  (.0001) 316 
E 433 468  (.120) 521 
F 95 147  (.017) 329 
G 68 152  (.00000) 269 
H 59 134  (.0001) 251 
 20
philosophical question about the use of full optimality as a benchmark. Clearly, 
no precise solution has been feasible until very recently and it is difficult to think 
that the industry, based on just 100 years of competition or experience, would 
have found the most efficient structure among so many possibilities. Even the 
very high performing supply chain for car G scores less than one half on the 
(Σijyijaij - EΣijziaij)/(MaxzΣijzijaij - EΣijzijaij) measure. While this certainly is a case 
where bounded rationality is a reasonable assumption, it is obviously very hard to 
argue for any specific benchmark other than full optimality.  
III.iii. An optimization model 
The results in Table 4 tells us that actual supply chain designs internalize 
many more adjustments than one would expect if designs were random. They do 
not tell us why this is. To this end, we will use simulated GMM to estimate an 
optimization model of supply chain design, aiming to show that it can be 
portrayed as the solution to a program like (P). This will allow us to measure the 
extent to which ours is the right model of supply chain design. Specifically, we 
formulate a program in which adjustment-costs plus noise are minimized, and 
show that the former can not be ignored. One way to do this is by writing the 
objective function in (P) as (N-n)w + ½Σi∈N[f(SI)Σj∈I (βaij + eij)  +mΣj∉I (βaij + 
eij)], where once again N is the number of parts, n is the number of firms, w(Sb-1) 
are fixed adjustment-costs in a firm of size Sb, f(Sb) are the variable adjustment-
costs in a firm of the same size, m are the variable adjustment-costs in the market, 
aij is the frequency of mutual adjustment, and eij is normally distributed noise. The 
idea is now to evaluate the importance of adjustment frequencies by looking at the 
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magnitude and significance of β. Since the theory allows the f(Sb)’s to be constant, 
we simplify a bit by restricting them to be independent of firm size. This allows 
us to write the objective function of (P) in terms of the two parameters f/w and 
m/w, thus reducing the dimensionality of the estimation problem. On the other 
hand, since this is an unnecessary restriction, we achieve the formal simplicity at 
the cost of estimating a coarser and presumably less well fitting model.  
There are, however, significant computational barriers to even this plan. 
To estimate the model with simulated GMM, we start with a provisional 
parameter value β’ (say 1) and solve P for a number of randomly drawn {eij} 
matrices. After using the appropriate moment conditions to evaluate β’, we repeat 
the procedure for a new parameter value, continuing until we find the best 
estimate. We might thus end up solving (P) more than 2000 times. But for N = 36, 
the number of feasible solutions to (P) is comparable to the number of seconds 
passed since the big bang, resulting in what presently are insurmountable 
computational demands. Rather than reducing the number of parts, we have once 
again chosen to constrain the simulated solutions to the same size-distribution of 
firms as that in the data, denoted by (S1o, S2o, ..Sno). That is, we test that parts are 
allocated to minimize adjustment-costs under the assumption that the supply chain 
has to follow an exogenously imposed size-distribution. In our first two tests, 
reported in Tables 3 and 4, we made the same assumption in order to be 
conservative. It is hard to evaluate whether it is conservative in this third test, but 
we here have to make it for computational reasons.20 
                                                 
20 Apart from the theoretical advantages of estimating the model without this constraint, it would 
also allow us to calibrate the model by estimating the relative magnitudes of fixed- versus variable 
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A fixed size-distribution implies that the number of firms is constant, and 
the objective function in (P) reduces to ½Σi∈N[fΣj∈I (βaij + eij)  +mΣj∉I (βaij + eij)]. 
This can be expressed as ½(f-m)Σi∈NΣj∈I (βaij + eij)  + ½mΣi∈NΣj∈N (βaij + eij), 
where the last term is a constant and (f-m) < 0. So total adjustment-costs are 
minimized by having as many intra-firm adjustments as possible, while respecting 
the actual size-distribution. Consequently, (P) is equivalent to the following much 
simpler Partitioning Problem  
             MaxS Σi∈NΣj∈I (βaij + eij), s. t. Sb= Sbo, for all b.                         (P’)            
We can interpret (P’) as a problem in which 36 parts have to be put into n firms of 
predetermined sizes in such a way that the sum of the intra-firm benefits, (βaij + 
eij), is maximized. If β = 1 and the variances of the eij’s were 0, the objective in 
(P’) is the same measure used in the simulations underlying Table 4. Because we 
are holding the size-distribution constant, the β‘s can not give us insights into the 
relative magnitudes of fixed- versus variable adjustment costs. They are just 
weights relative to the random effects, with the values of 0 and 1 being the most 
natural benchmarks.  
While it is much, much smaller than (P), (P’) is still a very large integer 
programming problem. In the typical supply chain, it has more than 1022 possible 
solutions, but can be formulated as a linear integer program with about 2000 
                                                                                                                                                 
adjustment costs. There are three possible ways to reduce the computational burden. The first and 
most direct solution is to study an industry with fewer parts. A second possibility is to use near-
optimal solutions to P. We could conceivably use solutions that are within, say 1% of optimal, and 
still get close to the true parameter values. However, our experiments with this have not resulted in 
significant reductions in computation time. The third avenue is to define approximation by 
processor time and work with an inflated version of the best solution found after a fixed amount of 
time. We evaluated this for about 350 runs on industries B and C, and found that it worked fairly 
well. However, it is hard to put bounds on the degree of approximation involved.   
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variables and 4000 constraints. If we use a number of tricks to speed up the 
program, the CPLEX IP code allows us to find an optimal solution in a reasonable 
amount of time. Most of our individual runs take ten to fifteen minutes, although 
the time varies from a few seconds (for supply chain E) to several days or weeks 
(for supply chains F and B). The results reported below are based on a total of 
roughly 25,000 optimizations or one and a half years of processor time.  
We estimate β for individual supply chains from the moment condition: 
                            EΣij[yij –Prob(xij=1|β*)]aij = 0,                                    (1)                       
where yij and xij are 0-1 indicators of co-production, referring to the data and the 
simulations, respectively.21 In practice, we find a measure of Prob(xij=1|β’) as the 
average value of xij(β’) over 100 simulations based on β’. We arrive at this 
average as follows: We first draw 100 independent {eij} matrices each consisting 
of 630 independent draws from N(0, σ2), where σ2 is the variance of the aij’s.  
Given a provisional β’ and the first matrix, we then solve P by finding the 
allocation that maximizes Σijxij(β’)[β’aij + eij] subject to the constraint that the 
size-distribution is identical to the actual. After solving (P’) for the other 99 {eij} 
matrices, we assign β’ a score of Σ100Σij xij(β’)aij/100.22 We repeat the process for 
several other provisional β’s, searching for a score equal to Σijyijaij. 
To estimate the model on pooled data, we sum the left hand side of (1) over the 
eight supply chains to arrive at the moment condition: 
                                                 
21 For a specific {eij}, the solution to P’ does not change for very small changes in β, and 
Σijxij(β*)aij is a decreasing step-function. However, since we are using the expectation of this and 
the {eij} are normally distributed, the left side of (1) is a decreasing and continuous function of β.   
22 Since individual optimizations of supply chain B took up to two weeks, the analysis of that is 
less rigorous. We used just 30 simulations for each value of β, and in some of them went with 
approximate solutions.  
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E Σsupplychains{Σij[yij –Σ100xij(β*)/100]aij}=0.                              (2)                             
We can sketch an argument to the effect that the resulting estimate β* is 
consistent by taking limits as the number of supply chains (R) and the number of 
simulations per chain (T) go to infinity. To this end, we denote the true parameter 
value by β0, a sequence of estimates by β1, β2,.. βn,.., the data-matrices by y(1), 
y(2),…y(T), and the simulated solution matrices by x(1, βn ), x(2, βn), …x(R, βn). If 
the model is correct, the data are generated by y(e, β0, a) = Argmax∑ij (β0aij+ 
eij)yij, and as R grows without bound, we will have a distribution of y’s that reflect 
β0 (as well as σ2 and a). The simulated solutions are generated by x(e, βn, a) = 
Argmax∑ij (βn aij+ eij)xij, and as T grows without bound, we will have a 
distribution of x’s that reflect βn (as well as σ2and a). The distribution of the x’s 
will converge to that of the y’s as βn converges to β0. 23  
We calculated the standard errors of the estimates by parametric 
bootstrapping from the asymptotic distributions.24 Specifically, we drew a random 
{eij} matrix and found a hypothetical design by solving MaxS Σi∈NΣj∈I (β*aij + eij), 
s. t. Sb= Sbo, for all b. We then treated the solution as if it was the actual and 
estimated a value of β for it. Doing this 100 times gave us 100 point estimates and 
                                                 
23Since there is a fixed number of zeroes and ones in each x, we may also be able to show that the 
simulation noise average out, such that we can work with a finite T. It may also be possible, but 
much harder, to get results for very large N. These results would then also apply to the estimates 
for individual supply chains. However, this remains a question for further research. 
24 The estimation of standard errors is complicated by the fact that the left side of (1) is a step-
function of β for any finite number of simulations, such that the estimated value of β* is a member 
of an interval. Specifically, it is not clear how to find standard errors if Σ100Σij xij(β’)aij/100 is flat 
over very large intervals. Since we are looking at roughly 1022 solutions and β ∈ [0, 1], such 
problems would seem “unlikely”, but they can not be ruled out a priori. However, we are pleased 
to report that the iteration processes involved in the estimations were very well-behaved. We 
searched over grids of length down to .01 for the industry models, and down to .001 for the pooled 
model. In all cases the left hand sides of (1) and (2) are strictly decreasing in β and in most cases 
convex. We believe that it may be possible to develop some more rigorous arguments about this, 
but leave them as questions for future research. 
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we use the standard error from that distribution as the standard error of our 
estimates of β. The results are reported in Table 5, where the row labeled 
POOLED refers to estimates with pooled data.  
Table 5 
Models of Max Σijxij(β)[βaij + eij].1 
Car β* s.e. β* 
POOLED .314 .095 
A .40 .15 
B  .29 .11 
C .27 .10 
D .37 .14 
E .26 .26 
F .21 .11 
G .35 .12 
H .33 .13 
                                             1Standard errors are bootstrapped.  
                              N=5040 for the pooled model, 630 for supply chains A-H. 
 
In spite of the fact that we estimated a one-parameter model with coarse 
data, the betas are, with the exception those for supply chain E, significant. In 
light of the very different supply chain designs documented in Table 2, the betas 
are also surprisingly similar. While each of the eight supply chains has solved the 
design problem in its own way, it appears that they all weigh the adjustment-costs 
to a similar degree.  
Because the aij’s and the eij’s have the same variance, we can use the 
magnitudes of the betas to get another perspective on the influence of adjustment 
frequencies. We have portrayed the supply chain as maximizing sums of βaij + eij, 
so β* = .33 suggests that our theory and measures capture about .33/[.33 + 1], or 
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one fourth, of the forces going into the determination of supply chain design. The 
extent to which the model fits the data is surprising in light of the complexity of 
the optimization problem postulated by the theory. As discussed in connection 
with Table 4, one can reasonably question the practical possibility of full 
optimality and thus of its use as a benchmark. As a way to judge the possible 
implications of this, we looked at the implications of smaller or larger values of β. 
Using the actual Σijyijaij score as a benchmark, and focusing on the pooled 
estimates, the score for β = 0 (no rationality?) is .65, the score for β = ½ is 1.23, 
that for β = 1 is 1.51, and that for very large β (full rationality?) is 1.59.25 So while 
the firms do surprisingly well, there is room for improvement. 
Summarizing the results, we have provided robust and multifaceted 
evidence in support of the claim that the adjustment-cost theory provides a good 
explanation for several apparently very different supply chain designs. 
IV. Comparing Supply Chain- and Firm-Level Estimation 
Since the supply chain-level model is theoretically superior to a firm-level 
(make-or-buy) model, it is interesting to compare the empirical results from the 
two models. Specifically, how much more precisely could we estimate the model 
by using the entire matrix of adjustment frequencies, as opposed to a single row? 
To look at this, we represent the firm by body-in-white - a part always made by 
the brand name manufacturer. Since the pair-wise ratings between body-in-white 
and the other parts have larger variance than those in any other row, this choice 
                                                 
25 The corresponding numbers for the interview data are .68, 1.39, 1.66, and 1.73. 
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gives the firm-level model as much information as possible and thus leads to the 
most conservative evaluation.26  
To minimize confounds, we compare the supply chain-level model to an 
analogously constrained and estimated firm-level GMM. Specifically, if body-in-
white is co-produced with s1 other parts, (e1j) is a vector consisting of 35 
independent draws from N(0, σ2), and σ2 is the variance of all the aij’s, we portray 
the firm as solving 
                      Max Σjx1j(βa1j + e1j), s. t. Σjx1j = s1.                                  (P’’)                         
In close analogy to (1), we estimate β from the moment condition 
E Σj[y1j –Σ100x1j(β*)/100]a1j =0.                                   (3) 
For each value of aij, this model gives us an estimate of Prob (x1j=1|aij). To 
evaluate the extent to which the firm-level model fits the supply chain data, we 
insert these probabilities into the entire matrix, subtract {yij}, square each cell, and 
sum the squares to find the sum of squared residuals (SSR) over the 630 cells.  
As there is little reason to estimate a firm-level model with GMM, we also 
estimate an (unconstrained) logit model of co-production with body-in-white. 
Since this model is based on a different functional form, it is a bit harder to 
compare with our supply chain model, but we can measure its relative 
performance by finding the SSR over the 630 cells as above. The SSRs from the 
supply chain model, the firm-level GMM model and the firm-level logit model 
are given in Table 6 below. 
 
                                                 
26 If we had chosen to represent the firm by a part that is produced in isolation, the logit model 
would have been inestimable, while our model would be unchanged. 
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Table 6 
Sum of Squared Supply Chain Residuals (SSR) by Alternative Models.1 
Car Supply Chain GMM  Firm GMM  Firm Logit  
A 117.2 136.2 133.5 
B 117.4 151.1 150.5 
C 74.4 89.3 88.6 
D 84.8 99.3 97.4 
E 105.9 115.1 114.6 
F 88.6 100.6 99.2 
G 60.5 72.9 71.9 
H 56.7 70.8 70.8 
                                 1 All entries are based on 630 pairs of parts. 
The table shows that the supply chain-level model consistently fits better 
than either of the two firm-level models. Since it makes more intensive use of the 
data, it is not surprising that the supply chain-level model does better than the 
firm-level GMM model.  Because its theoretical advantage is larger when fewer 
parts are co-produced, we would expect the superiority of the supply chain-level 
model to differ between supply chains. The Table bears this out, as the ratio 
between the SSRs generally is larger in supply chains like H, G, C, F, and D 
where fewer parts are co-produced, and smaller in supply chain E.  
As mentioned above, it is harder to compare the supply chain GMM with 
the logit model because the difference in data sets is confounded with a difference 
in functional forms. To (imperfectly) decompose the effects, we can start by 
comparing the two firm-level models. From Table 6, we see that the logit model 
fits the questionnaire data bit better, but Table 6A in the Appendix shows that the 
firm-level GMM fits the interview data better. As one would expect, the relative 
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advantages of the two functional forms depend on the data sets. On the other 
hand, the logit model clearly does less well than the supply chain-level GMM, 
suggesting that any advantages tied to functional forms are overwhelmed by those 
associated with more intensive use of the data. 
One could argue that the above model comparison is biased against the 
firm-level models in favor of the supply chain-level model, because only the latter 
is estimated on the data used for comparison. However, we will claim that this 
standard of comparison is the only correct one, since it is consistent with the 
belief that all co-production decisions follow the same logic. We can nevertheless 
get another take on the model comparison by evaluating model performance 
relative to co-production with body-in-white only. These results are given in 
Table 7 below. 
Table 7 
Sum of Squared Firm Residuals (SSR) by Alternative Models.1 
Car Supply Chain GMM  Firm GMM  Firm Logit  
A 7.41 8.52 8.29 
B 7.31 5.01 4.75 
C 7.25 6.59 6.35 
D 7.26 8.01 7.88 
E 3.57 3.62 3.53 
F 8.58 8.45 7.95 
G 6.13 7.29 7.14 
H 6.36 7.15 7.06 
                                      1 All entries are based on 35 pairs of parts. 
Since the two firm-level models are estimated on that data only, this 
measure does not penalize them for over-fitting and will be more favorable to 
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them. Even so, the supply chain-level model still outperforms the two firm-level 
models in more than half of the industries. We conclude that supply chain-level 
estimation offers significant advantages over firm-level (make-or-buy) estimation, 
but admit that it uses more data and poses non-trivial computational difficulties.  
V. Discussion 
Using original data that map directly to the theory, we have presented 
several successively deeper tests of the proposition that the firm is a low variable-, 
but high fixed cost way to govern adjustments. Our results are strong and robust 
across alternate specifications and supply chains. By taking a supply chain-level 
perspective, we have been able to avoid the mis-specifications inherent in make-
or-buy estimates and extract more information from the data, especially in the 
cases where many parts are out-sourced. Consistent with this, we found that our 
optimization model fits better than a firm-level model, both theoretically and in 
this dataset. Our innovative testing strategy is not tied to the adjustment-cost 
theory and it should be possible to apply it to other theories of the firm as well.  
We freely admit that the empirical analysis can and should be improved. 
Our data are very good and we particularly encouraged by the .915 correlation 
between our two measures of adjustment frequency. However, we cannot 
generally rule out that “the frequency with which there needs to be a mutual 
adjustment”, is picking up something other than adjustment frequency.27 As other 
innovative testing strategies, ours opens up a new territory with no prior work. It 
is hard to say the first and last word on an important topic. However, based on the 
                                                 
27 As a preliminary check in this direction, we asked our expert for a rough matrix with ratings of 
the “magnitudes” of mutual adjustments, and can report that analyses with that produced much 
weaker results than those with frequencies.  
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importance of the theoretical questions, as well as the strength and robustness of 
our results, we believe that the paper is a worthwhile and useful starting point.   
An important area for future research is to test competing theories and 
combinations of theories. In the simplest possible execution, each theory could be 
represented by a matrix measuring the predicted degree of contracting difficulty 
between each pair of mega-parts. For example, a test of the property rights theory 
would rely on a matrix of co-specialized assets. We could then run a horse race 
between the different theories based on the fit of the corresponding optimization 
models. While the reader will appreciate the computational challenges of 
estimating multiple parameters on the present data-set, our techniques transfer 
readily to simpler industries. It will thus be very desirable to develop alternative 
data-sets. 
Another interesting avenue for further research is to deepen the analysis of 
the adjustment-cost theory. We have measured adjustments in terms of frequency 
only – treating them all as the same. However, one would expect that different 
types of adjustments carry different expected costs. In the extreme case where a 
small set of identical adjustments may be repeated, the theory predicts that the 
parties will agree on ex ante pricelists – lowering variable costs of adjustment in 
the market (Wernerfelt, 1997). It would be interesting, but challenging, to develop 
a measure of adjustment difficulty and use it to moderate the frequencies.   
It is possible to interpret our results as reflective of endogeneity with the 
idea being that there are more or fewer mutual adjustments between two parts 
because they are or are not co-produced. However, we are not too worried about 
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this. First, since we collected this measure in two different ways, both would have 
to be subject to the problem in essentially the same way. Secondly, all data 
collected explicitly differentiated the needs for mutual adjustments from actual 
adjustments. We took pains to ask the experts about “the frequency of needs for 
mutual adjustments”. Thirdly, our theory predicts that adjustment between co-
produced parts is cheaper. In the interest of simplicity, we derived P under the 
assumption that all needed adjustments are made. But without this assumption, we 
would find that more of the needed adjustments are implemented within than 
between firms. It is certainly possible to question our point estimates based on this 
line of reasoning, but the argument relies on the premise is that the theory is 
correct. So to the extent that reverse causality is driven by differences in 
adjustment-costs, we are not too unhappy about it.  
In closing, the robust patterns in the data presented here should give pause 
to those who a priori reject the importance of ex post adjustment in the theory of 
the firm. We recognize that much work remains to be done, and hope that the 
approach taken here will prove fruitful in further testing of this and other theories 
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Appendix: Results Based on Interview Data  
Table A-1 
Adjustment Frequencies from Interviews and Co-production Data for Supply Chain A28 
 
                                                 
28 The highlighted 3 in the upper left corner refers to the adjustment frequency between “body-in-white” 
and “headlining”, while the highlighted 0 tells us that the two are produced by different firms. 
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1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1  5 2 6 6 4 2 0 2 2 0 2 3 3 2 3 2 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1  6 5 5 3 3 2 4 4 0 6 6 6 0 5 2 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1  3 3 0 1 4 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1  6 5 3 1 2 2 0 4 5 2 0 4 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1  5 3 1 2 2 0 4 5 2 0 4 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1  0 0 3 3 0 3 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0  0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1  5 1 3 5 1 0 4 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 5 6 4 0 4 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0  0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1  6 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  3 4 4 4 2 2 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0  1 0 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  5 1 6 6 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0  0 3 3 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0  6 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0  0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0  
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Table A-2 
Descriptive Statistics by Supply Chain1 
Car Fraction co-
produced 
Number of parts co-
produced  
r(co-production, 
adjustment frequency)  
A .29 19, 5, 2, 2, 2 .52  
B .26 16, 9, 4, 2 .49 
C .14 13, 5, 2, 2, 2 .57 
D .18 15, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2 .53 
E .79 32 .48 
F .17 14, 5, 3, 3, 2, 2 .53 
G .12 12, 4, 3, 2, 2, 2 .61 
H .11 11, 4, 3, 3, 2 .60 
                                 1N=630.  
 
Table A-3 
Probability of Pairwise Co-production by Adjustment Frequency1 
Car 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
A .235 (.002) .385 (.218) .386 (.134) .410 (.114) .478 (.045) .476 (.061) .619 (.005) 
B .226 (.016) .231 (.697) .182 (.917) .385 (.073) .217 (.754) .571 (.004) .667 (.001) 
C .116 (.017) .192 (.321) .159 (.455) .256 (.067) .174 (.424) .238 (.182) .333 (.033) 
D .154 (.028) .115 (.866) .182 (.567) .205 (.199) .217 (.402) .429 (.010) .476 (.003) 
E .768 (.150) .808 (.506) .795 (.525) .821 (.448) .870 (.249) .905 (.173) .905 (.186) 
F .156 (.099) .192 (.468) .045 (.998) .231 (.247) .130 (.801) .429 (.007) .476 (.003) 
G .094 (.009) .000 (1.00) .045 (.978) .282 (.008) .130 (.555) .429 (.001) .476 (.001) 
H .083 (.015) .115 (.542) .091 (.708) .205 (.068) .174 (.224) .238 (.070) .286 (.025) 

















Sum of Internalized Adjustments by Supply Chains1 




Models of Max Σijxij(β)[βaij + eij].1 
Car β* s.e. β* 
POOLED .276 .069 
A .33 .13 
B .31 .08 
C .23 .09 
D .26 .11 
E .28 .36 
F .23 .09 
G .32 .10 
H .25 .10 
 1Standard errors are bootstrapped.  
N=5040 for the pooled model, 630 for supply chains A-H. 
Car EΣijzijaij Σijyijaij MaxzΣijzijaij 
A 162 264  (.001) 407 
B 143 231  (.001) 420 
C 80 132  (.012) 312 
D 101 174  (.004) 340 
E 436 476  (.097) 526 
F 96 153  (.011) 356 
G 69 154  (.0000) 295 




Sum of Squared Supply Chain Residuals (SSR) by Alternative Models.1 
Car Supply Chain GMM  Firm GMM  Firm Logit  
A 115.2 131.8 132.8 
B 116.3 149.8 149.3 
C 73.7 92.1 93.0 
D 87.9 98.2 98.5 
E 114.6 107.0 107.1 
F 88.2 96.1 96.6 
G 62.4 68.2 68.6 
H 59.2 66.7 66.1 
                     1 All entries are based on 630 pairs of parts. 
 
Table A-7 
Sum of Squared Firm Residuals (SSR) by Alternative Models.1 
Car Supply Chain GMM  Firm GMM  Firm Logit  
A 7.29 8.26 8.14 
B 6.77 4.48 4.54 
C 7.16 5.72 5.66 
D 7.78 7.42 7.31 
E 3.88 3.57 3.50 
F 8.69 7.71 7.73 
G 6.51 6.83 6.74 
H 6.98 6.92 6.80 
                   1 All entries are based on 35 pairs of parts. 
 
 
